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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 A thirty-eight-year-old orthopedic surgeon comes home to his emp-
ty house following a typical ten-hour day at the hospital. Recently 
divorced and without children, he drops his keys at the front door 
and heads towards the living room with the take-out dinner he 
picked up on his way home. He turns on the news and pours himself 
a glass of red wine. Ever since his divorce, he has been drinking wine 
more frequently than he used to, perhaps to mask his loneliness. Af-
ter his third or fourth glass of wine, he turns off the television, 
brushes his teeth, and goes to bed.  
 At five o’clock in the morning, he awakes to his alarm clock and 
throws on his running shoes. After his usual five-mile run, he grabs a 
piece of toast and heads to the hospital. Today is just like any other 
day for the surgeon; at eleven o’clock, he reviews the chart of a pa-
tient scheduled for a total knee-replacement. The surgeon goes into 
the operating room to discuss with the patient, one more time, the 
risks and alternatives associated with this surgery, along with its 
potential benefits. He asks the patient whether she has any further 
questions before anesthesia is administered. After the patient signs 
the standard informed consent form and acknowledges that she 
wishes to proceed with the surgery, the orthopedic surgeon leaves the 
room to prepare for the procedure.  
 Shortly after the knee-replacement surgery, the patient begins 
developing complications, ultimately requiring an additional surgery. 
Frustrated with the outcome of the original procedure, the patient 
chooses to have a different physician perform the second surgery. De-
spite all efforts during the second surgery, the patient loses full func-
tion of her leg.  
                                                                                                                                 
 ? J.D. Candidate 2015, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to thank 
my parents, Laurie and Jim Haston, for their love and support throughout all of my educa-
tional endeavors. I would also like to thank the incredible faculty at the Florida State Uni-
versity College of Law for their support, feedback, and encouragement.  
1126  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1125 
 
 The patient begins hearing rumors about the orthopedic surgeon’s 
recent, nasty divorce. She also sees him at local restaurants, sitting 
alone at the bar with a drink in front of him. After the patient calls 
some mutual friends of the surgeon’s ex-wife, she learns that the or-
thopedic surgeon has developed a drinking problem since his divorce. 
She decides to file a medical malpractice suit, alleging that the sur-
geon did not obtain her informed consent before the procedure be-
cause he failed to inform her of his alcoholism.  
 Situations like the one described above present an important and 
undefined question to the medical field: whether a physician has a 
duty to inform his patient about his alcoholism, drug abuse, and/or 
mental illness (such as depression) in gaining a patient’s informed 
consent before a procedure.1 On one hand, we live in a country with a 
medical system that values patient autonomy.2 We believe a patient 
has the right to make her own medical decisions based on a physi-
cian’s adequate disclosure of the potential risks and benefits involved 
in a given procedure.3 The large amount of medical malpractice suits 
and medical regulations also demonstrate the importance we place on 
patient safety.4 On the other hand, however, we also recognize the 
shortcomings of the informed consent doctrine.5 We recognize an in-
dividual’s right to privacy6 and that alcoholism, mental illness, and 
drug-related impairments are private matters deserving protection 
from disclosure to the public to effect recovery.7  
 This Note will argue that a physician, in gaining a patient’s in-
formed consent, does not have a duty to disclose to the patient 
whether he suffers, or has suffered, from alcoholism, drug abuse, or 
mental illness. Physicians are still human and thus deserve the right 
to privacy regarding such personal matters as are enjoyed by the 
                                                                                                                                 
 1. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their 
Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 376 (1994) (“The types of personal characteristics . . . 
requiring disclosure are undefined.”). 
 2. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The root premise is 
the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that ‘[e]very human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.’ ” 
(quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914))). 
 3. See id. at 781. 
 4. See, e.g., Frederick Levy et al., The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 
2005: Preventing Error and Promoting Patient Safety, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 398-406 (2010). 
 5. See Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From “Doctor is Right” to 
“Patient has Rights”, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2000). 
 6. See Barry R. Furrow, Data Mining and Substandard Medical Practice: The Differ-
ence Between Privacy, Secrets and Hidden Defects, 51 VILL. L. REV. 803, 803 (2006) (“We 
properly value privacy: it is a desirable end state and a precondition for identity, allowing 
individuals to achieve goals such as autonomy and solidarity with peers . . . .”). 
 7. See Rebecca Sara Feinberg, The Impaired Physician: Medical, Legal, and Ethical 
Analysis with a Policy Recommendation, 34 NOVA L. REV. 595, 605 (2010) (“Confidentiality 
is [a] key element to successful intervention and treatment.”).  
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public generally. This Note will point out that such conditions do not 
have as material of an effect on the performance of medical proce-
dures as people generally assume. Yet, if these impairments were to 
rise to a level such that patient safety would be compromised, liabil-
ity must fall somewhere. Thus, instead of requiring physicians to dis-
close their personal impairments during the informed consent pro-
cess, the emphasis should be placed on the hospital’s duty to properly 
monitor its physicians’ credentials. Further, disclosure through the 
informed consent doctrine is not the proper way to protect patients 
from physicians who are incapable of adequately performing medical 
procedures due to alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illnesses. Rather 
than pointing the finger at the physician for lack of disclosure, the 
issue of impaired physicians involves a bigger picture that the hospi-
tal system is, itself, deficient.  
 Hospitals should implement methods that will incentivize physi-
cians to get the treatment they need without the attached stigmati-
zation. Hospitals must implement and properly maintain confidential 
yet effective programs designed to identify and rehabilitate physi-
cians suffering from alcoholism, drug-dependency, and mental ill-
nesses to ensure that those physicians practicing medicine are safely 
capable of doing so. This emphasis on a hospital’s duty to monitor 
and qualify physicians provides the ideal balance of physician privacy 
and patient safety.  
 This Note will begin by exploring the history and evolution of the 
informed consent doctrine in the American medical field. A discus-
sion of the characteristics of “impaired physicians” will follow. This 
Note will then examine the relationship between impaired physicians 
and the scope of the informed consent doctrine. Finally, I will articu-
late that the duties of a hospital to monitor and credential physicians 
via a corporate negligence theory strikes the proper balance between 
protecting a physician’s privacy and patient’s safety.  
II.   INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE 
 The informed consent doctrine is a relatively recent phenomenon 
principled on the American concept of autonomy.8 Informed consent 
was seen as one tool in response to the imbalance of power in  
the provider-patient relationship.9 The idea was that “requiring phy-
sicians to provide more information to their patients [would] help to 
                                                                                                                                 
 8. See Barbara L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 
591, 594 (2006). 
 9. See MARK A. HALL ET AL., MEDICAL LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
197-98 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013). 
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redress the power imbalance problems created by the inequality  
of knowledge.”10  
 The doctrine was originally an outgrowth of the tort of battery.11 
Claims for an informed consent violation amounted to an intentional 
and unauthorized touching of another. 12  Beginning in the 1950s, 
courts “viewed risk nondisclosure situations as analogous to and an 
extension of those battery cases where consent was fraudulently ob-
tained.”13 Bringing an informed consent claim under a battery theory 
had significant advantages over bringing a negligence-based claim:  
First, and most importantly, battery did not require the patient to 
prove by an expert medical witness that the defendant had deviat-
ed from an accepted medical standard of care. Second, battery did 
not require the patient to prove that he would have refused the 
treatment if he had been given the proper information. Third, bat-
tery would entitle the patient to recover damages even if the oper-
ation did not have a “bad result.” Fourth, as an intentional tort, 
battery might have entitled the patient to an instruction on puni-
tive damages, which would not be available in an action based up-
on negligence.14 
 Recognizing the possibility for unnecessary liability, courts gradu-
ally began pulling away from the battery theory of informed consent 
and, instead, started moving toward a standard negligence theory of 
medical malpractice.15 The battery-based claims generally dealt more 
with procedures in which no consent was given, while the new negli-
gence-based claims more commonly involved situations in which the 
consent given was inadequate.16 Indeed, basing an informed consent 
claim on a theory of negligence “more closely comports with the reali-
ty of medical practice.”17 “[D]octors’ informed consent practices re-
quire the exercise of judgment. . . . Since the treating physician re-
tains some flexibility in determining how much information to dis-
close, cases based on a failure to obtain informed consent, like other 
medical malpractice claims, are based on negligence.”18 
                                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. at 198. 
 11. William J. McNichols, Informed Consent Liability in a “Material Information” 
Jurisdiction: What Does the Future Portend?, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 711, 714-16 (1995). 
 12. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 593 (“[The informed consent doctrine] is a natural 
outgrowth of the common law tort of battery that prohibits intentional unauthorized  
bodily contact.”). 
 13. McNichols, supra note 11, at 714. 
 14. Id. at 715. 
 15. See id.  
 16. See Laurel R. Hanson, Note, Informed Consent and the Scope of a Physician’s Duty 
of Disclosure, 77 N.D. L. REV. 71, 72, 75 (2001).  
 17. Atwell, supra note 8, at 595. 
 18. Id. at 595-96. 
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 Autonomy is a fundamental American concept that is furthered by 
the informed consent doctrine.19 “Competent adults exercise that au-
tonomy by deciding whether or not to consent to medical treat-
ment.”20  Judge Cardozo, in one of the pioneer cases involving in-
formed consent, famously stated: “Every human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with  
his own body.”21 Thus, the informed consent doctrine ensures that  
patients “have the material information with which to make an  
informed choice.”22  
 There are two main standards that courts apply to determine a 
physician’s required level of disclosure: the “reasonable patient”23 
standard and the “professional malpractice”24 standard.25 Under the 
reasonable patient standard, a physician’s required level of disclosure 
is that which a reasonable patient would consider “material” in mak-
ing a medical treatment decision.26 Some courts have argued that de-
termining the materiality of a risk from a reasonable patient’s point 
of view is the best way to respect autonomy.27  
 The professional malpractice standard defines the scope of disclo-
sure as the information which a reasonable physician in similar cir-
cumstances would provide to a patient.28 Today, about half of the 
states follow this standard.29 The professional malpractice standard 
                                                                                                                                 
 19. See id. at 594-95. 
 20. Id. at 594. 
 21. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), abrogated by Bing v. 
Thunig, 142 N.E.2d 3, 7-9 (1957), superseded by statute, Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109, 1975 
N.Y. Laws 134-35.  
 22. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 596. 
 23. This is also known as the “material risk” or “patient-centered” standard. 
 24. This is also known as the “professional disclosure” or “reasonable physician” standard. 
 25. See HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 205; Hanson, supra note 16, at 75.  
 26. See HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 205; see also Hanson, supra note 16, at 75.   
 27. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[T]he patient’s 
right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal. . . . The scope of the phy-
sician’s communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need, and 
that need is the information material to the decision.” (emphasis added)); see also Kurtz, 
supra note 5, at 1251 (“The Canterbury patient-based standard seems more consistent with 
the purpose of 'informed consent' which includes a respect for a patient’s autonomy interest 
and a desire to have patients participate in the decision making process.”). “A small num-
ber of jurisdictions take an even more protective approach, requiring disclosure of infor-
mation that a particular patient (as contrasted with a ‘rational patient’) would have want-
ed to make his or her decision.” HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 205. 
 28. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 205; see also Hanson, supra note 16, at 75. 
 29. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 214. “In adopting the reasonable physician standard, 
courts seemed to be assuming that a competent physician acting in good faith would convey 
to patients information essential to their understanding of relevant risks, benefits, and 
alternatives, rather than simply provide the traditionally meager disclosures . . . .” Ben A. 
Rich, Medical Paternalism v. Respect for Patient Autonomy: The More Things Change the 
More They Remain the Same, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 87, 106-07 (2006). 
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does not require physicians to speculate as to what the reasonable 
patient would want to know; instead, it applies the appropriate medi-
cal standard of care to utilize the physician’s professional judgment.30 
Testimony from medical experts is necessary, however, because the 
professional malpractice standard measures disclosure according to 
the appropriate physician’s standard of care.31  
 Under either standard of informed consent, various situations 
may excuse disclosure,32 including emergencies,33 areas of common 
knowledge,34  areas of individualized knowledge,35  situations where 
disclosure would “ ‘foreclose rational decision’ or ‘pose psychological 
damage’ to the patient,”36 and occasions when a patient has waived 
disclosure.37 Such exceptions to the doctrine are generally set up as 
affirmative defenses.38  
 Regardless of which standard courts apply, the informed consent 
doctrine has received significant criticism.39 Many studies suggest a 
dichotomy between disclosure and comprehension or retention.40 As 
such, even when physicians disclosed sufficient information, “few pa-
tients understood or remembered what they had been told about 
their medical condition and treatment options.”41  Additionally, there 
is a valid concern that excessive disclosure, often due to a fear of liti-
gation, will result in patients foregoing medically necessary treat-
                                                                                                                                 
 30. See Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ind. 1992) (“[A physician] should 
not be called upon to be a ‘mind reader’ with the ability to peer into the brain of a prudent 
patient to determine what such patient ‘needs to know,’ but should simply be called upon 
the discuss medical facts and recommendations with the patient as a reasonably prudent 
physician would.”).  
 31. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 215; see also Hanson, supra note 25, at 75 (“Under this 
standard, a patient usually must present expert testimony to demonstrate that a physician, 
following acceptable medical practice, would have disclosed the injury-causing risk.”). 
 32. See Hanson, supra note 25, at 73-75. 
 33. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 221 (“There is no duty to disclose information in an 
emergency situation where the patient is not competent, immediate treatment is required 
to prevent more serious harm, and no substitute decisionmaker is available.”).  
 34. Id. at 221 (“There is no duty to disclose risks ‘of which persons of average sophisti-
cation are aware.’ ”).  
 35. Id. (“The patient cannot recover for the physician’s failure to disclose a risk al-
ready known by the patient.”).  
 36. Id. at 221. This is known as the “therapeutic privilege,” which courts have applied 
only in a few circumstances. Id. at 221-22. 
 37. Id. at 222. 
 38. See id. (“The defendant generally has the burden of proving that an exception to 
the duty to inform is present.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Atwell, supra note 8, at 597-98 (“In practice, informed consent is far from 
perfect.”); Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1245 (“[T]he doctrine falls short of its intended purpose.”).  
 40. See also, e.g., David A. Herz et al., Informed Consent: Is It a Myth?, 30 
NEUROSURGERY 453 (1992); Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of 
Informed Consent: A Review and Critique of Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1983). 
 41. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 202.  
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ments.42 Other scholars suggest that the doctrine of informed consent 
doctrine does not fulfill its “goals of patient protection” in the modern 
practice of medicine.43 Further, the elements needed to succeed in a 
cause of action for lack of informed consent make recovery difficult; 
thus, many claims are never litigated.44  
 In bringing an informed consent claim, the plaintiff will generally 
have to prove the following: “(1) that the medical procedure carried a 
specific risk that was not disclosed, (2) that the physician violated the 
applicable standard of disclosure, (3) that the undisclosed risk mate-
rialized, and (4) that the failure to disclose the information caused 
the patient’s injury.”45 
 Proving materialization of the undisclosed risk and causation are 
often the most difficult barriers for plaintiffs. 46  One can imagine 
many circumstances where physicians might fail to disclose a risk 
without the risk ever materializing. For example, if a physician fails 
to disclose to a patient that a particular surgery could result in pa-
ralysis (arguably a very material risk), and paralysis never material-
izes, the patient would not have a valid claim against the physician. 
When such a situation occurs, it seems the informed consent doctrine 
serves the purpose of protecting patients from injury rather than its 
stated purpose of respecting patient autonomy.47 To prove causation, 
a plaintiff must convince the court that a reasonable patient in simi-
lar circumstances would have refused the treatment had the disclo-
sure been sufficient.48 This requirement is often a very difficult bur-
den of proof to satisfy and tends to raise a range of issues.49 While the 
causation requirement is an objective standard, the jury is permitted 
to consider the plaintiff’s particular circumstances.50 The law is still 
fuzzy and inconsistent regarding how much of a plaintiff’s subjective 
circumstances should be considered.51   
                                                                                                                                 
 42. See Barry R. Furrow, Doctors’ Dirty Little Secrets: The Dark Side of Medical Pri-
vacy, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 283, 293 (1998) (“Disclosure creates the risk that a patient will 
refuse the physician’s care because of the status or the addiction, rather than looking at 
the particular case and the risks posed.”). Ironically, this trend would actually compromise 
patient safety. 
 43. Atwell, supra note 8, at 611.  
 44. See, e.g., HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 217. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See id. 
 47. “Vindicating patient autonomy is at the heart of all inadequate consent cases, 
whether the theory is based on battery or negligence.” McNichols, supra note 11, at 715. 
 48. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 217.  
 49. See id. at 217-18. 
 50. See id. (“[A] fact finder applying objective causation rules may take into account char-
acteristics of plaintiff, including ‘idiosyncrasies, fears, age, medical condition, and religious 
beliefs.’ ” (quoting Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 123-24 (Tenn. 1999))). 
 51. See id.  
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III.   IMPAIRED PHYSICIANS 
“As a result of their status [doctors] are expected to be above human 
failings, while proving immune to the ailments that afflict the  
general population. Nonetheless, to err is human and in being  
human doctors inevitably make mistakes in the normal course of  
providing care.”52 
 An “impaired physician is a medical doctor who suffers from alco-
holism, drug addiction, or mental illness.”53 The American Medical 
Association (AMA) uses the phrase “impaired physician” as a term of 
art and defines it as “ ‘the inability to practice medicine adequately 
by reason of physical or mental illness, including alcoholism or drug 
dependency.’ ”54 The AMA’s designation of a physician as being im-
paired can potentially result in the suspension or revocation of the 
physician’s medical license.55  
 “Given the everyday work stress that medical professionals expe-
rience, it is not surprising that many physicians may turn to alcohol 
or substance abuse.”56 The rate of impairment for physicians is con-
sistent among various specialties, regions, and age ranges; “[n]o 
group of physicians are immune.”57 The problem is real and the num-
bers are frightening. The Medical Board of California estimates that 
eighteen percent of the physicians in California abuse alcohol or oth-
er drugs at some point during their careers.58 The sad fact remains: 
physicians have a higher rate of impairment than non-physicians, yet 
they have more trouble securing treatment.59 The fear that physi-
cians will receive some negative stigma from their peers, along with 
the fear of potential punishment, often causes physicians to conceal 
their alcoholism, substance abuse, or mental illness.60 This pattern 
                                                                                                                                 
 52. A. Mavroforou et al., Alcohol and Drug Abuse Among Doctors, 25 MED. & L. 611, 
612 (2006). 
 53. Feinberg, supra note 7, at 598. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 601, 613. For purposes of this note, the phrase “impaired physician” shall 
refer to the concept more generally (that of a physician suffering from alcoholism, drug 
abuse, or mental illness) rather than the term of art, as used by the AMA. 
 56. Ila S. Rothschild, Law for Physicians: An Overview of Medical Legal Issues, 21 J. 
LEGAL MED. 437, 440 (2000) (book review).  
 57. Roger S. Cicala, Substance Abuse Among Physicians: What You Need to Know, 
HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN, July 2003, at 39.  
 58. See Lucian L. Leape & John A. Fromson, Problem Doctors: Is There a System-Level 
Solution?, 144 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 107, 108 (2006).  
 59. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 599 (“Physicians have both a higher prevalence of 
impairment and more difficulty obtaining treatment than non-physicians.”). 
 60. Id. (“[T]he impaired physician often conceals his addiction because the stigma 
attached to physician impairment makes seeking help significantly more difficult  
than for the general population. Potential punitive responses may also play a role in  
incenting concealment.”).  
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means that physicians have a much lower likelihood of receiving the 
treatment they need.61  
 Alcoholism and substance abuse have been so stigmatized among 
medical professionals that discussion of the topic is taboo.62 Despite 
the high incidences of alcoholism and drug abuse among physicians, 
little talk is present at professional meetings, and coverage in medi-
cal school curricula is sparse.63  
 Unsurprisingly, there is a good deal of literature arguing that 
physician impairment has a significant, negative impact on a physi-
cian’s medical performance.64 One study reveals that physicians who 
reported making a major medical mistake within the last three 
months were more likely to suffer from depression or struggle from 
alcohol or drug dependence.65 However, as one professor at the Uni-
versity of Tennessee College of Medicine also suggests: “Most physi-
cian substance abusers continue to function quite well until the prob-
lem is far advanced.”66 Further, “[a]lcoholics can often remain sober 
during working hours for many years, even though they drink large 
quantities at night and on weekends.”67 Other medical literature of-
ten compares alcoholism in physicians to sleep-deprivation. Indeed, 
studies have revealed that physicians who have not slept in twenty-
four hours (as is not entirely uncommon) have impaired “cognitive 
psychomotor performance to the same degree as having a 0.1% blood 
alcohol level.”68 Yet, there is a lack of empirical evidence demonstrat-
ing a correlation between sleep deprivation and medical errors.69 This 
                                                                                                                                 
 61. See id. at 600.  
 62. See Cicala, supra note 57, at 39; see also Feinberg, supra note 7, at 597 (“Physician 
addiction is taboo, but this silence injures both the physician and his patients.”).  
 63. Cicala, supra note 57, at 39.  
 64. See, e.g., Bobinski, supra note 1, at 298-99 (“The abuse of drugs and alcohol is in 
turn associated with higher risks of work-related performance deficits. Physicians with 
substance abuse problems may present several different sorts of risks to their patients.”); 
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 597 (“Alcohol and drug addiction interfere with multiple func-
tions in daily life. There is no doubt, when the addicted individuals are physicians, the 
interference affects their ability to practice medicine, causing their patients to receive a 
lower standard of care than they would otherwise receive.”).  
 65. Looking at Alcohol Use Disorders Among Surgeons, PHYSICIAN’S WEEKLY (Aug.  
23, 2012), http://www.physiciansweekly.com/surgeons-alcohol-use-disorders/ [hereinafter 
Alcohol Use]. However, “the study did not identify the nature of the errors or  
determine the cause and effect.” Carolyne Krupa, 15% of Surgeons Struggle with Alcohol 
Problems, AM. MED. NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.amednews.com/article/20120306/ 
profession/303069998/8/. 
 66. Cicala, supra note 57, at 39. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Merit Buckley, Imposing Liability in the United States Medical Residency  
Program: Exhaustion, Errors, and Economic Dependence, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.  
305, 313 (2009). 
 69. See id. at 314.  
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logically seems to suggest that a similar correlation between alcohol-
ism and medical errors would also be lacking.70  
 Regardless, the fact remains that there is a higher percentage of 
physicians suffering from alcoholism or drug abuse than there is in 
the general population, and something must be done to address this.  
IV.   IMPAIRED PHYSICIANS AND THE SCOPE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
 Under either a professional malpractice standard or a reasonable 
patient standard, the exact scope of required disclosure remains gray. 
It is clear that informed consent requires, at a baseline, the benefits 
and risks of a particular medical procedure and potential medical al-
ternatives.71 But even at this minimal level, how much does a physi-
cian have to disclose about the benefits, and how significant must a 
risk be to warrant disclosure? The reasonable patient standard  
attempts to answer this question by applying the materiality concept: 
whether the information would be material to the reasonable  
patient’s decision about the treatment.72 Yet, this also leaves little 
guidance. The professional malpractice standard judges the scope  
of disclosure based on the applicable standard of care in the particu-
lar circumstances, but this often and simply yields a battle of  
expert witnesses.73  
 The bottom line is that the exact scope of required disclosure, un-
der either standard, remains unknown.74 Given this level of uncer-
tainty, coupled with increased medical litigation and attention to  
patient autonomy,75 it is not surprising that the trend in the informed  
consent doctrine seems to be moving toward expanding the scope  
of disclosure.  
 Beyond just the disclosure of risks, benefits, and alternatives to 
the medical treatment, recent attempts to raise this “floor” of disclo-
sure have been made.76 Attention has been drawn towards disclosure 
of a medical treatment’s economic implications and a physician’s per-
                                                                                                                                 
 70. See Alcohol Use, supra note 65 (“Although actual injury to patients from impaired 
physicians is incredibly rare, alcohol abuse and dependence are important factors to con-
sider when thinking about patient safety in surgery . . . .”).  
 71. See Bobinski, supra note 1, at 293 (“In the past, both patients and courts have 
focused attention on the benefits and risks of a particular treatment . . . .”). 
 72. See Hanson, supra note 16, at 75. 
 73. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 596. 
 74. See Bobinski, supra note 1, at 342-43.  
 75. I say this hesitantly. See supra Part II for a critique of the informed consent doctrine.   
 76. See Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1255-56 (“In recent years, the preoccupation of the 
informed consent rules with disclosure of risks inherent in a proposed treatment has ex-
panded to the disclosure of risks of not having a proposed treatment and risks associated 
with having treatment by a particular physician.”).  
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sonal characteristics. 77  The personal characteristics of physicians 
that have been discussed as potentially warranting disclosure before 
medical procedures include a physician’s surgical experience,78 HIV 
status,79 deterioration of skills,80 conflicts of interest,81 and impair-
ments.82 Though the majority rule does not require physicians to dis-
close personal characteristics, a growing minority of states are re-
quiring such disclosures.83  
 Although the scope of disclosure obligations continues to expand, 
the line must be drawn somewhere. Requiring physicians to disclose 
to patients that they have suffered from, or are currently suffering 
from, alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness, opens the door to  
a flood of other potential disclosure obligations. Sure, one could argue 
that alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness has the potential  
to negatively affect a physician’s medical performance, and thus 
should be disclosed.84 But if we are willing to say that these personal 
impairments require disclosure, where do we end? Conceivably,  
almost every personal attribute of a physician might be relevant  
                                                                                                                                 
 77. See id. at 1257-58.  
 78. See Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 498, 506-07 (Wis. 1996) (proposing 
that a physician’s lack of experience with intricate and difficult procedures may be materi-
al to a patient’s decision to proceed with the particular physician, rather than the actual 
procedure). However, the Johnson principle of disclosure has not been widely expanded, as 
the case is seen as unique and fact-specific. See Barry R. Furrow, Patient Safety and the 
Fiduciary Hospital: Sharpening Judicial Remedies, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 439, 454 (2009); see 
also Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Doctor, Are You Experienced? The Relevance of Disclo-
sure of Physician Experience to a Valid Informed Consent, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 373, 402-07 (2002). 
 79. See Iheukwumere, supra note 78, at 396.  
 80. See Semeraro v. Connolly, Civ. A. No. 92-4636, 1992 WL 392621, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 14, 1992). 
 81. Compare Furrow, supra note 78, at 452 (“Courts have been less willing to impose 
an obligation on physicians to disclose putative economic conflicts of interest.”), with Moore 
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990) (“[A] physician who is seeking 
a patient’s consent for a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and 
to obtain the patient’s informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the pa-
tient’s health, whether research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (La. Ct. App. 1991) 
 83. See, e.g., id. (holding that physician’s failure to inform patient of physician’s 
chronic alcohol abuse violated obligations of informed consent disclosure); Gaston v. 
Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that a physician’s surgical experi-
ence should be disclosed to a patient during the informed consent process). 
 84. See Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1196 (holding that physician’s chronic alcohol abuse 
“create[d] a material risk associated with the surgeon’s ability to perform, which if dis-
closed would have obliged the patient to have elected another course of treatment . . . .”); 
see also Iheukwumere, supra note 78, at 402 (“Certainly, the fact of a physician’s alcohol-
ism would be of significant concern to a reasonable patient, since an alcohol impaired phy-
sician, or one likely to be impaired during an invasive procedure would impact on the like-
lihood of a mistake during the procedure.”). 
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to a patient in making a decision on whether to proceed with a  
medical intervention.85  
 For example, consider a physician who skips breakfast the morn-
ing of a surgery. Should he have to inform his patient of this personal 
detail? If a physician skips breakfast, he will certainly become hun-
gry (if he is not already). Surely, hunger could potentially have a 
negative effect on a physician’s medical performance.  
 Even more extreme yet under the same logic, consider a physician 
who gets into a heated argument with his wife the night before per-
forming surgery and is now in a bad mood. Should he be required to 
inform his patient of this in gaining consent before the surgery? One 
could also see how a bad mood might negatively affect a physician’s 
medical performance.  
 And finally, consider a physician who has a ritual of listening to a 
certain song before every surgery for good luck. He has listened to 
this song before every successful surgery for the past fifteen years of 
his practice. The morning of his next surgery, however, he is in a 
rush and does not get a chance to listen to his “lucky song.” Cogni-
zant that he skipped this important step, he becomes concerned. 
Should the physician have to disclose this information to his patient? 
As outrageous as the scenario might sound, requiring disclosure of 
this idiosyncrasy logically follows from the current, expanding scope 
of the informed consent doctrine.  
 As demonstrated above, expanding the disclosure obligations to 
include a physician’s alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness has 
the potential to create unintended bounds.86 The process of obtaining 
informed consent from a patient will likely transform from an expla-
nation of the potential risks associated with a procedure to a laundry-
list-reading of the physician’s personal life.87 In fact, for this exact 
reason, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to expand the 
doctrine of informed consent to include mandatory disclosure of a 
physician’s alcoholism.88 As explained in Kaskie v. Wright, “[t]o do so, 
where the absent information consists of facts personal to the treat-
ing physician, extends the doctrine into realms well beyond its origi-
nal boundaries.”89 Such an expansion of the doctrine will likely make 
                                                                                                                                 
 85. See Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (affirming summary 
judgment for defendant physician in an informed consent claim, rhetorically asking: “Are 
patients to be informed of every fact which might conceivably affect performance in the 
surgical suite?”). 
 86. See id. 
 87. See Bobinski, supra note 1, at 295 (“A seemingly infinite number of provider char-
acteristics combine to determine the physician’s ability to deliver appropriate care to a 
particular patient at any given moment.”). 
 88. Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217. 
 89. Id. 
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any attempt at line-drawing very difficult,90 and patients will likely 
become so overwhelmed with information to the point that they de-
cline many important medical procedures.  
 Though physicians are undoubtedly held to higher expectations 
than the general public and are bound by fiduciary obligations to 
their patients,91 it is easy to forget that physicians are still human. 
Physicians make mistakes and have struggles in their personal lives 
just like everyone else. Because alcoholism, drug abuse, and mental 
illnesses are such personal and sensitive issues, physicians will have 
even more incentive to conceal or deny any such problems if they 
know they will have to share these details with their patients. The 
result will be even more physicians who are unable to seek the 
treatment they need due to conscious denial or concealment.92 Fur-
ther, because physicians are even more likely to keep their impair-
ments invisible, as has been indicated, requiring physicians to dis-
close such impairments to patients in the informed consent process 
will likely be a fruitless expansion of the doctrine.  
 This is not to say that a patient who receives substandard care 
from a physician who suffered from alcoholism, drug abuse, or men-
tal illness is without legal recourse against that physician.93 Howev-
er, such recourse does not create a separate legal issue under the in-
formed consent doctrine.94 Legal remediation for substandard care is 
still an option for patients who are injured by their physicians’ negli-
gence.95 As the Court of Appeals of Arizona properly held as a matter 
of law in Ornelas v. Fry:  
[T]he fact that [the physician] may have been an alcoholic at the 
time of the surgery on [the patient] does not create in and of itself 
a separate issue or claim of negligence. It is only when that alco-
holism translates into conduct falling below the applicable stand-
ard of care that it has any relevance.96 
                                                                                                                                 
 90. See id. (explaining that expansion of the informed consent doctrine to include dis-
closure of a physician’s alcoholism will make limitations not easily definable). 
 91. See Furrow, supra note 78, at 444. 
 92. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 598 (“It is [the] risk to patients that makes physi-
cian impairment incompatible with the practice of medicine. And it is this incompatibility 
that leads the impaired physicians to further conceal their addiction . . . .”). 
 93. See Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d. 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (“[I]nformation personal 
to the physician, whether solicited by the patient or not, is irrelevant to the doctrine of 
informed consent. Our holding should not, however, be read to stand for the proposition 
that a physician who misleads a patient is immune from suit. . . . [We do not] see a need to 
expand this doctrine into a catchall theory of recovery since other causes of action provide 
avenues for redress to the injured patient.”). 
 94. See Ornelas v. Fry, 727 P.2d 819, 823 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
 95. See Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1259 (“For example, it is conceivable that a physician’s lack 
of experience in performing an operation would support a plaintiff’s case in negligence.”). 
 96. Ornelas, 727 P.2d at 823. 
1138  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1125 
 
 Additionally, it is undisputed that the doctrine of informed con-
sent is based on the concept of autonomy. Under the most patient-
friendly standard of the doctrine, a physician informs a patient of the 
material risks associated with the procedure in order to facilitate an 
informed decisionmaking process.97 However, to allow practicability 
of the doctrine, the materiality of a risk must be limited to risks spe-
cifically related to the medical procedure itself.98 Determining the 
materiality of a risk specifically related to the medical procedure has 
already proven to be a difficult task.99 If we further consider the phy-
sician’s personal characteristics to be a material risk, the doctrine 
will eventually prove unworkable because of undefined boundaries.100  
 By disclosing the risks “specifically germane to surgical or opera-
tive treatment,”101 a patient is able to exercise his “right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body.”102 This limitation to the con-
cept of materiality accomplishes the doctrine’s intended goal: auton-
omy.103 However, considering a physician’s impairment to be a mate-
rial risk is not concerned with autonomy, it concerns something en-
tirely separate: patient safety.  
 The arguments in favor of expanding the informed consent doc-
trine to impose a disclosure obligation of the physician’s alcoholism, 
drug abuse, or mental illnesses all implicitly center around the same 
general argument: such physician impairments negatively affect a 
physician’s performance of medical procedures, thereby compromis-
ing the safety of the patient.104 Yet, the informed consent doctrine 
                                                                                                                                 
 97. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 594-95. 
 98. The informed consent doctrine should not be expanded “to include matters not 
specifically germane to surgical or operative treatment.” Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 
217 (Pa. Super. 1991); see also Semeraro v. Connolly, Civ. A. No. 92-4636, 1992 WL 392621 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 1992).  
 99. See HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 217-18; Iheukwumere, supra note 78, at 392 
(“Subsequent to Canterbury many important informed consent decisions came down ad-
dressing the materiality of information in divergent ways . . . .”); see also Feinberg, supra 
note 7, at 621 (“There is no clear consensus in the courts or in the medical literature about 
physician disclosure and the informed consent process.”).  
 100. See Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217 (refusing to expand the informed consent doctrine to 
include matters not specifically germane to the surgical treatment because such expansion 
would “extend[] the doctrine into realms well beyond its original boundaries” and limita-
tions would not be easily definable). 
 101. Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217.  
 102. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), abrogated by Bing 
v. Thunig, 142 N.E.2d 3, 7-9 (1957), superseded by statute, Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109, 
1975 N.Y. Laws 134-35. 
 103. Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1251. 
 104. See, e.g., Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (deter-
mining that the physician’s abuse of alcohol “increased [the] potential for injury during 
surgery”); Feinberg, supra note 7, at 597 (stating that physician impairment results in 
“patients . . . receiv[ing] a lower standard of care than they would otherwise receive”); Fur-
row, supra note 42, at 293 (“Certainly an alcoholic surgeon may have an impairment that 
might seriously affect performance and thus success rate.”); Iheukwumere, supra note 78, 
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was not developed with the purpose of ensuring patient safety.105 The 
doctrine was simply intended to allow patients to weigh the potential 
risks against the potential benefits of a specific medical procedure in 
order to informatively decide for themselves whether they wish to 
proceed with the procedure.106 However, within this informed deci-
sionmaking process, the patient must be able to assume that the 
physician will operate in a reasonably safe manner; the patient must 
be able to proceed under an assumption that the physician’s alcohol-
ism, drug abuse, or mental illness will not pose a significant risk.107  
 The solution to such a dilemma is not an expansion of the in-
formed consent doctrine. If a physician is truly impaired by alcohol-
ism, drug abuse, or a mental illness such that it will significantly and 
negatively affect his performance of medical procedures to a degree 
that would compromise patient safety, the physician should not be 
able to simply disclose this information to a patient and avoid any 
potential liability. The informed consent doctrine should not be ex-
panded such that it can be used strategically as a liability “out” 
where physicians are truly unfit to perform medical procedures. In-
stead, stepping back and considering the bigger picture is necessary. 
V.   DUTIES OF THE HOSPITAL: A CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE THEORY 
“[With impaired physicians,] the goal is to eliminate the risk to the pa-
tient, not simply to inform the patient and let the patient choose.”108 
 Despite various opinions in medical literature, something we 
know for sure is that physicians who are currently suffering or have 
suffered from alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness may pose 
threats to patient safety by performing medical operations.109 If such 
impairment reaches a level where patient safety would be compro-
mised, the solution is not disclosure through expanded informed con-
                                                                                                                                 
at 402 (“[A]n alcohol impaired physician . . . would impact on the likelihood of a mistake 
during the procedure.”); see also Judice v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 919 F. Supp. 978, 984 
(E.D. La. 1996) (holding that the discovery of alcohol in a physician’s system just prior to 
surgery raised valid concerns about the risk to public safety). 
 105. “[P]atient autonomy is at the heart of all inadequate consent cases . . . .” McNich-
ols, supra note 11, at 715. 
 106. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 596 (“Informed consent, then, is designed to protect 
patients by ensuring that they have the material information with which to make an  
informed choice.”). 
 107. See Bobinski, supra note 1, at 302 (discussing other personal physician conflicts: 
“we want to ensure that patients receive good quality care of sufficient amount, duration, 
and scope regardless . . . .”). 
 108. Furrow, supra note 42, at 293.  
 109. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 598. 
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sent obligations, but rather a bigger-picture solution: placing a duty 
on hospitals to properly credential and monitor physicians.110  
 A hospital’s duty to non-negligently credential and monitor physi-
cians is an obligation that is part of a larger conception known as  
the “corporate negligence theory.”111 Under the corporate negligence  
theory, a hospital can be held directly liable for injuries to patients  
resulting from substandard medical care.112 The reasons for such a 
theory are obvious: as blame for sub-quality medical treatment  
continues to be placed directly on the treating physicians, hospitals 
will be free of any duty (and thus any incentive) to try and prevent  
medical errors.113  
 Consider the nature of the modern hospital. Hospitals are big 
businesses, spending millions marketing themselves through “expen-
sive advertising campaigns.” They provide a range of health services, 
and the public expects emergency care, radiological and other testing 
services, and other functions as a result of hospitals’ self-promotion. 
And yet the legal relationships in the hospital are byzantine, creating 
two strongly autonomous management structures side by side: a hos-
pital administrative structure in parallel with the hospital medical 
staff, which operates as a staff of independent contractors. The very 
existence of this odd structure shields hospitals from liability under 
agency law rules for the errors of their physicians, even when it is the 
hospital systems that have allowed the physicians to fail.114  
 The concept of placing liability directly on a hospital under a cor-
porate negligence theory has long been argued as an abdication of the 
medical practice; “only an individual properly educated and licensed, 
and not a corporation, may practice medicine.”115 Traditionally, hospi-
tals were seen as merely the structure under which physicians oper-
ated. 116  Nonetheless, in 1965, the Supreme Court of Illinois an-
nounced its decision to impose liability directly on a hospital for inju-
                                                                                                                                 
 110. See Furrow, supra note 42, at 293 (“[D]isclosure of [the physicians’] limitations 
may be of questionable efficacy . . . . It risks destroying provider privacy while reducing the 
pressure on state authorities and hospitals to monitor their physicians and set proper and 
reasonable standards for practice.”). 
 111. See Judith M. Kinney, Tort Law—Expansion of Hospital Liability Under the Doc-
trine of “Corporate Negligence”—Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991), 65 
TEMP. L. REV. 787, 792 (1992).  
 112. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 481 (“Direct or ‘corporate’ liability contrasts with 
vicarious liability in that it imposes on hospitals a duty of care owed directly to patients 
with respect to medical judgment.”).  
 113. See Furrow, supra note 42, at 459. 
 114. Id. (emphasis added). 
 115. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ill. 1965). 
 116. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 169 (Wash. 1984) (“The hospital’s role is no 
longer limited to the furnishing of physical facilities and equipment where a physician 
treats his private patients and practices his profession in his own individualized manner.”). 
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ries resulting from physician error.117 Darling v. Charleston Commu-
nity Memorial Hospital has since been seen as the seminal case for 
imposing direct liability on a hospital via a corporate negligence the-
ory for substandard medical care.118 
 A hospital’s duty to non-negligently credential its physicians is the 
critical first step to addressing the issue of impaired physicians. This 
duty “entails reviewing physicians’ competency and performance his-
tory before admission to the medical staff and periodically (typically 
every two years) thereafter.”119 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 
Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital described the mini-
mum requirements for a hospital (or the hospital’s credentialing 
committee) in investigating and evaluating an applicant’s qualifica-
tions for hospital privileges:  
[A] hospital should, at a minimum, require completion of the appli-
cation and verify the accuracy of the applicant’s state-
ments . . . . Additionally, it should: (1) solicit information from the 
applicant’s peers, including those not referenced in his application, 
who are knowledgeable about his education, training, experience, 
health, competence and ethical character; (2) determine if the ap-
plicant is currently licensed to practice in this state and if his li-
censure or registration has been or is currently being challenged; 
and (3) inquire whether the applicant has been involved in any ad-
verse malpractice action and whether he has experienced a loss of 
medical organization membership or medical privileges or mem-
bership at any other hospital. The investigating committee must 
also evaluate the information gained through its inquiries and 
make a reasonable judgment as to the approval or denial of each 
application for staff privileges.120  
 Additionally, in 1986, the National Practitioner Data Bank 
(NPDB) was established as part of the Healthcare Quality Improve-
ment Act121 and was designed to provide licensing and credentialing 
entities with a more uniform body of information regarding discipli-
                                                                                                                                 
 117. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 258.  
 118. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 481. “Conventional forms of direct liability entail 
primarily administrative, not medical, functions such as maintaining safe premises, sterile 
equipment, and adequate rules and regulations. Darling is recognized as extending direct 
corporate liability to substandard medical care rendered by independent doctors. Hospitals 
thus can be found liable for some act of negligence on their part with respect to patient care 
decisions made by independent doctors . . . .” Id. 
 119. Id. at 482. 
 120. Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 174-75 (Wis. 1981). 
 121. Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (2006).  
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nary actions taken against physicians.122 Especially following the es-
tablishment of this databank, the duty to properly credential physi-
cians makes clear that a hospital cannot simply plead ignorance with 
respect to a physician’s information in granting that physician privi-
leges.123 Imposing this duty on hospitals also means that if a hospital 
chooses to grant privileges to a physician who has suffered from alco-
holism, drug abuse, or mental illness in the past, the hospital bears 
the risk of such impairments resurfacing. Through the credentialing 
process, the hospital should be regarded as having been put on notice 
about potential relapses that may occur and thus should be charged 
with taking necessary, continual steps to prevent such occurrences. 
Further, a hospital should be free to grant privileges to a physician 
currently undergoing treatment for alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental 
illness; however, it should be presumed that the hospital underwent 
investigative measures to ensure that this physician is able to safely 
practice medicine.124 The AMA has made clear that it opposes the dis-
crimination against otherwise capable physicians solely because “the 
physician is either presently, or has in the past, been under the super-
vision of a medical licensing board in a program of rehabilitation.”125 
 Hospitals must be charged with granting privileges to only those 
physicians capable of safely practicing medicine. This may entail a 
standardized screening evaluation for current alcoholism, drug 
abuse, or mental illness. When this evaluation is conducted at the 
commencement of the credentialing process, it will be regarded as 
nondiscriminatory and can be a step towards removing the stigmati-
zation of such impairments in the medical profession. In a case for 
negligent credentialing, evidence to show a breach of this duty would 
                                                                                                                                 
 122. “The comprehensive reporting system requires medical boards to report licensure 
revocations, suspensions, restrictions, censures, reprimands, probation, and licenses sur-
rendered relating to the physician’s professional competence or professional conduct. The 
statutory restrictions of the ADA do not insulate impaired physicians from being reported 
to the NPDB.” Yuri N. Walker, Protecting the Public: The Impact of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act on Licensure Considerations Involving Mentally Impaired Medical and 
Legal Professionals, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 441, 447 (2004).  
 123. See Elisabeth Ryzen, The National Practitioner Data Bank: Problems and Pro-
posed Reforms, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 409, 411, 419 (1992) (“Hospitals are required to query the 
Data Bank before granting physicians privileges. . . . Failure to request information [from 
the NPDB every two years] means the hospital will be presumed to have knowledge of any 
information in the Data Bank concerning the applicant in any subsequent lawsuit.”). None-
theless, the consistency of the NPDB regarding the reporting of physician impairments 
needs improvement. See POLICIES RELATED TO PHYSICIAN HEALTH § H-355.992 (Am. Med. 
Ass’n 2011) (“Our AMA will continue to monitor the issue of reporting impaired physicians 
to the National Practitioner Data Bank and will seek further clarification of ambiguities or 
misinterpretations of the reporting requirements for impaired physicians.”).  
 124. See Katharine A. Van Tassel, Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of the Federal 
System for Publishing Reports of “Bad” Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2031, 2057 (2012); see also Kinney, supra note 111, at 793-95 (discussing 
actual or constructive notice triggering a hospital’s duties to act).  
 125. POLICIES RELATED TO PHYSICIAN HEALTH, supra note 123, § H-275.949. 
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include the hospital’s own bylaws on credentialing physicians, state 
licensing regulations, the Joint Commission’s Standards for Hospital 
Accreditation,126 common law, and other relevant authorities.127  
 The hospital’s duty to non-negligently credential physicians is 
generally accepted by the courts as part of the obligations of hospital 
administration.128 However, an affirmative duty on the hospital to 
monitor its physicians has been seen as more controversial.129 Several 
courts have rebuffed any duty to contemporaneously monitor treat-
ment decisions made by its physicians, reasoning that it would consti-
tute an unlawful interference of the physician-patient relationship.130  
 Starting at the local level, under a corporate negligence theory, a 
hospital must be much more active in monitoring its physicians to 
ensure those practicing medicine are safely capable of doing so.131 
Given that the hospital should have non-negligently credentialed its 
physicians, it will be charged as being on notice of any potential red 
flags in the physician’s record of past or current alcoholism, drug 
abuse, or mental illness. The hospital should have a heightened af-
firmative duty to monitor these physicians.  
 In order to adequately monitor physicians, general awareness of 
the prevalence of impaired physicians must increase.132  Hospitals’ 
risk management committees should go through training and educa-
tion programs on the potential signs of alcoholism, drug abuse, or 
mental illnesses. Similar information should be distributed to all 
hospital staff so that everyone is aware of the symptoms to look for in 
potentially impaired physicians. The frequent monitoring of these 
high-risk physicians, then, should include frequent in-person inter-
views, self-evaluations, and anonymous peer-review programs.  
 To ensure that such monitoring programs are effective, however, 
hospitals also need to have a system in place that guarantees confi-
                                                                                                                                 
 126. See JOINT COMMISSION, www.jointcommission.org (last visited June 29, 2014). 
 127. See Kinney, supra note 111, at 790-91.  
 128. See HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 482. But see Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc., 
386 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Ark. 2012) (refusing to recognize a claim for negligent credentialing 
on the basis that regulatory oversight of hospitals is sufficient).  
 129. See HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 482.  
 130. See, e.g., Gafner v. Down East Cmty. Hosp., 735 A.2d 969, 979-80 (Me. 1999). 
 131. Id. at 979 (quoting Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168-69 (Wash. 1984)) (“The 
doctrine of corporate negligence has . . . been utilized by courts to require hospitals to exer-
cise reasonable care to insure that the physicians selected as members of hospital medical 
staffs are competent. [Those courts] have also held that hospitals have a continuing duty to 
review and delineate staff privileges so that incompetent staff physicians are not re-
tained.”). “Health care’s casual approach to monitoring physician performance contrasts 
markedly to that of other professions whose conduct affects the public welfare. Commercial 
pilots, for example, must pass both physical and performance examinations every year.” 
Leape, supra note 58, at 109. 
 132. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 597 (“Physician addiction is taboo, but this silence 
injures both the physician and his patients.”). 
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dentiality and includes penalty waivers.133 Because many physicians 
already conceal any impairment they may have for fear of potential 
penalties and stigmatization from their peers, hospitals must ensure 
that all monitoring policies are conducted with the utmost respect for 
the physician’s confidentiality.134 Upon discovering alcoholism, drug 
abuse, or mental illnesses in physicians, hospitals should motivate 
those physicians to seek recovery through participation in treatment 
programs.135 Every state has a form of a physician health program 
designed specifically for physicians suffering from alcoholism or sub-
stance abuse.136 Completion of such a program should be a prerequi-
site for waiving the penalty of a complete revocation of hospital privi-
leges, which will encourage physicians to obtain the treatment they 
need but all so often do not get. 
 Imposing liability on hospitals for negligent credentialing and 
monitoring of physicians, rather than expanding the doctrine of  
informed consent, will place the task of determining the competency  
of physicians with the party in the more capable position to do so:  
the hospital.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
“The real issue is whether the physician is likely to perform well, 
regardless of an impairment or other personal characteristic.”137 
 Physicians suffering from alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental ill-
nesses may be perfectly capable of performing medical treatments to 
the necessary standard of quality.138 However, should such impair-
ments rise to a level such that the safety of the patient is compro-
mised, liability must fall somewhere in order to ensure proper pre-
ventative measures are taken and injured patients are not left with-
out legal recourse.  
 The prevalence of physicians suffering from alcoholism, drug 
abuse, or mental illnesses is a sad reality that cannot continue to be 
ignored.139 However, attempting to solve such a large-scale issue by 
expanding the scope of disclosure obligations under the informed 
consent doctrine would be both impracticable and counterintuitive. 
Such an expansion would be inconsistent with the original purpose of 
                                                                                                                                 
 133. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 608. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 607-09. 
 136. See Cicala, supra note 57, at 43-44. 
 137. Furrow, supra note 42, at 293. 
 138. See id. (“[A disclosure obligation] raises a difficult causation question, since alco-
holism may not always impair a physician’s performance.”). 
 139. See generally Feinberg, supra note 7, at 605 (discussing the prevalence of alcohol-
ism, drug abuse, and similar impairments in the medical field).  
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informed consent and would render the doctrine so lacking in cer-
tainty that it would eventually prove completely unworkable.  
 Further, confidentiality is an essential element for the proper 
identification of, treatment of, and recovery from alcoholism, drug 
abuse, and mental illness. Patients want to be sure that impaired 
physicians, incapable of safely practicing medicine, are identified and 
obtain the treatment they need. Yet, requiring physicians to disclose 
to patients that they suffer from, or have suffered from, such im-
pairments would be entirely illogical to achieve such a goal.  
 Addressing the issue of impaired physicians is part of a much 
larger web of actors than can be remedied through the informed con-
sent doctrine. Awareness to the problem of impaired physicians must 
increase generally within the medical profession. State medical 
boards and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care 
Organizations must cooperate with hospitals so that they have the 
necessary tools and information to begin the process.  
 Rather than expanding the informed consent doctrine, liability 
should be placed on the hospital under a corporate negligence theory 
when a hospital negligently credentials and monitors its physicians. 
The hospital is in the best position to ensure the competency of the 
physicians performing medical treatments, not the patient. Such a 
structure would protect the privacy of the physician and encourage 
detection and rehabilitation while having the effect of increasing pa-
tient safety on a broader scale.  
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